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NOTES

THE VIRTUES OF ABSTENTION:
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN
AL-NASHIRI II
NICHOLAS A. DIMARCO†
INTRODUCTION
Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed al-Nashiri was a high
level al Qaida operative, active off the Yemeni coast at the turn of
the twentieth century. He targeted U.S. Navy vessels operating
in the Port of Aden, including the USS Cole in an act of treachery
that killed seventeen members of the ship’s crew in October
2000.1 Arrested by local authorities in Dubai a year later, alNashiri was transferred into U.S. custody and detained at a CIA
black site.2 Five years after his removal to Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba in 2006, the Obama administration convened a military
†
Editor-in-Chief, St. John’s Law Review & Journal of Catholic Legal Studies;
J.D. Candidate, 2018, St. John’s University School of Law. The Author extends
thanks to his family for their support, to his professors, especially Professor Jane
Scott, for their mentorship, and to Him who gives joy to my youth. Psalm 43:3 (New
American).
1
Brief for the United States on Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the Military
Commission at 8–11, In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 30, 2016) (Nos.
15-1023, 15-5020), 2015 WL 9473946, at *8–10 [hereinafter Government’s Brief]. For
a collection of government documents related to al-Nashiri’s detention and the
charges filed against him, see The Guantánamo Docket: Abd al Rahim al Nashiri,
N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/10015-abd-al-rahimal-nashiri (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
2
In re Al-Nashiri (Al-Nashiri II), 835 F.3d 110, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting) reh'g denied, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 354 (2017). The black sites were
secretive interrogation cells operated by the CIA in various countries, such as
Poland. For a charged, at times chilling, report on the program, see generally
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 113TH CONG., COMM. STUDY OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM
(Comm. Print 2014).
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commission to try al-Nashiri on charges related to his attack on
the USS Cole and other vessels.3 The President did so under the
2009 Military Commissions Act (“2009 MCA”), the final product
of an extended dialogue among the President, Congress, and the
Supreme Court about the shape these commissions would take.
In the most recent round of litigation to reach a federal
court,4 counsel for al-Nashiri filed a habeas petition in the
District Court for the District of Columbia that collaterally
attacked the commission convened to try him.5 Seeking a
preliminary injunction that would bring commission proceedings
to a halt until resolution of his habeas petition, al-Nashiri argued
that the commission lacked jurisdiction to try him for his crimes
because they were not committed in the context of hostilities.6
Chief Judge Richard W. Roberts denied the injunction and
declined to exercise equitable jurisdiction over the habeas
petition during the pendency of the military commission trial.7
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia took a deferential posture to al-Nashiri’s
habeas petition.
In a split decision, the panel applied
Councilman abstention doctrine to the military commissions
convened under the MCA, clearing the way for al-Nashiri’s oftdelayed trial.8 The decision to abstain, while consistent with

3
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 113. Al-Nashiri also funded and directed the
attempted attack on the USS The Sullivans in January 2000, and the successful
bombing of the MV Limburg, a French supertanker, in October 2002. Id. at 113–14.
4
On a separate issue, al-Nashiri sought a writ of mandamus from the District
Court for the District of Columbia in late 2014 to challenge the constitutionality of
the appointment of two military judges on his Court of Military Commission Review
(“CMCR”) appellate panel. In re Al-Nashiri (Al-Nashiri I), 791 F.3d 71, 75 (D.C. Cir.
2015). The District Court denied the petition because al-Nashiri had not shown that
he was clearly and indisputably entitled to mandamus relief. Id. at 85–86. In any
event, the court reasoned that the President and Senate could “put to rest any
Appointments Clause questions regarding the CMCR’s military judges” by
nominating and confirming them. Id. at 86. The President and Senate did just that
in April 2016.
5
Al-Nashiri v. Obama, 76 F. Supp. 3d 218, 221 (D.D.C. 2014).
6
Id.
7
Id. at 223.
8
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 118; see also Peter Margulies, DC Circuit in AlNashiri: All Clear for Military Commission Trial, LAWFARE (Aug. 31, 2016, 9:30
AM), https://lawfareblog.com/dc-circuit-al-nashiri-all-clear-military-commission-trial
(approving the result). For an expert discussion of the decision, listen to The Lawfare
Podcast: Geeking Out on Al-Nashiri with Michel Paradis and Bob Loeb, LAWFARE
(Sept. 3, 2016), https://lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-geeking-out-al-nashiri-
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recent decisions by lower federal courts, contrasts markedly with
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,9 decided ten years earlier. There, the
United States Supreme Court showed little deference to the
executive, declined to take the path of abstention and instead
issued a wide-ranging opinion that validated the military
commission mechanism but invalidated the system as employed
by the Bush administration. Why does Councilman abstention
apply now but not before? What was missing in 2006, when
Hamdan was decided, that has since led federal courts to defer to
the military commissions?
And is judicial deference—in
particular abstention—the appropriate response to the military
commission system currently in place at Guantánamo?
This Note investigates those questions. Part I examines
various scholarly approaches to judicial deference, then considers
deference in the context of military commissions. In Part II, the
history of military commissions in the United States is examined,
paying particular attention to the extended dialogue among the
coordinate federal branches that created the system currently in
operation. The decision in Al-Nashiri II10 not to adjudicate a
collateral attack on one of these commissions is the focus of Part
III. That Part embraces the underlying jurisdictional challenge
at stake in Al-Nashiri II, the development of abstention doctrine
generally and as applied to the current commissions, as well as
the role judicial deference played in the panel’s decision. Finally,
in Part IV, this Note argues that the path of abstention had
many virtues in this case and as a rule of law, because it
furthered sound separation of powers principles by respecting the
considered judgments of Congress and successive Presidents.
Part IV first categorizes the type of deference the panel engaged
in by abstaining. Next, it considers the effect the decision will
have on future collateral attacks on commission proceedings, as
federal courts will now review military commission final
judgments, just as Congress and the President intended, rather
than intervening indiscriminately. This Note argues that this
michel-paradis-and-bob-loeb. For a discussion of abstention doctrine, see infra Part
III.B.
9
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
10
This Note follows the majority of commentators in referring to the most
recent D.C. Circuit decision as Al-Nashiri II. See, e.g., Stephen Vladeck, Al-Nashiri
II: Comity, Legitimacy, and the Military Commissions, LAWFARE (Aug. 31, 2016,
12:20 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/al-nashiri-ii-comity-legitimacy-and-military
-commissions.
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effect will, in turn, preserve the commission system created by
Congress—the branch best suited to weigh the intricate national
security considerations involved in prosecuting and bringing to
justice those who, in their attempt to thwart our military effort,
violate the laws of war.
I.

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Although chronicling every instance of judicial deference is
beyond the scope of this Note, a brief review will bring into
greater focus what is meant by the term here.11 Because
characterizing a judicial decision as “deferential” often involves a
value judgment, scholars have developed a variety of approaches
to defining deference. In the national security context, however,
judicial deference implicates separation of powers principles and
the balance to be reached among the coordinate branches when it
comes to decisions about the nation’s defense and security.
Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes say that
balance historically has been achieved through a process-based
approach that courts employ in extreme security contexts.12 This
approach shifts responsibility to Congress and the President, the
most democratic branches of government.13 The judiciary’s
willingness to limit its role in national security decision making
when there is bilateral institutional action aligns with Justice
Robert H. Jackson’s categorization of presidential power in the
The Steel Seizure Case,14 which is widely accepted as the guide to
modern analysis of separation of powers.15 The historical pattern

11
Instances where federal courts defer to the political branches are sundry, but
this Note focuses on the deference in the national security context, leaving aside
Chevron deference, for example. For a discussion of the application of Chevron
deference to foreign affairs, see Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign
Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War,
2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 60–66 (canvassing decisions in which courts deferred to the
executive on national security issues).
12
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During
Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 1, 5 (2004). Professors Issacharoff and
Pildes distinguish this process-based approach from “civil libertarianism” on the one
end, and “executive unilateralism” on the other.
13
Id.
14
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S.
579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
15
See Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2003) (referencing Justice
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Professors Issacharoff and Pildes discern can be summarized as
follows: “Where both legislature and executive endorse a
particular tradeoff between liberty and security, the courts have
accepted that judgment,” that is, deferred.16 On the other hand,
“Where the executive has acted in the face of legislation policies
or without legislative approval, the courts have invalidated
executive action, even during wartime, or scrutinized it more
closely.”17
Professor John Yoo takes issue with the latter part of this
pattern.18 Professor Yoo has provided a formal and functional
case for judicial deference to executive interpretations of foreign
affairs laws, described by scholars as the “executive unilateral
approach.”19 Recognizing the well-settled doctrine requiring
deference to reasonable executive interpretations of ambiguous
statutes,20 he has argued courts should be all the more willing to
defer to executive action where the president’s constitutional
powers as the Commander-in-Chief are implicated.21 In addition,
he points out that courts have historically deferred to reasonable
executive interpretations of treaties and customary international
law.22 But the more fundamental rationale for judicial deference
to the executive in this context is functional, not doctrinal. From
an institutional standpoint, courts lack the informationgathering capabilities that place the executive—with its own
“institutional experts and a wide global network of contacts”
uncontrolled by rules of evidence and discovery—in the superior
position to achieve national goals in international relations.23
Jackson’s “three now-canonical categories that guide modern analysis of separation
of powers”).
16
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 12, at 44.
17
Id.
18
Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign
Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 180 (2006).
19
Id. At least in the context of military commissions, Professor Yoo argues that
scholars have failed to articulate why congressional sanction of the commissions is a
necessary precondition for the executive to employ them. Id. at 212–13. Even the
Court in Hamdan declined to reach the constitutional question of whether the
president could convene a military commission without congressional approval in
cases of “controlling necessity.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (2006).
Because Congress has expressly authorized the military commissions at
Guantánamo, the question is largely academic and will not be discussed in this Note.
20
Ku & Yoo, supra note 18, at 195 (discussing Chevron deference).
21
Id. at 195–96.
22
Id. at 196–99.
23
Id. at 199–201.
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Moreover, the executive is politically accountable to the body
politic, which has the power to eventually change undesirable
interpretations and strategies.24 None of this is to say that courts
should abdicate their responsibilities in the face of executive
branch assertions, but the case for judicial caution where the
“[e]xecutive’s competence is maximal” and the judiciary’s is
“virtually nonexistent” is worth considering, especially when the
nation’s safety is at stake.25
Another approach, articulated by Professor Cass Sunstein,
advises that the judiciary proceed “cautiously and narrowly when
national security is at risk.”26
The characteristics of this
“minimalist alternative”27 are to (1) require that Congress
authorize any executive branch interference with constitutionally
protected interests, (2) ensure any deprivations of liberty are
accompanied by minimally fair procedures, and (3) issue narrow
and incompletely theorized decisions.28 The minimalist approach
to conflicts between civil liberty and national security has been
endorsed in prominent wartime decisions29 and has the
advantage of ensuring that the federal judiciary plays a role that
is best-suited to its institutional strengths and weaknesses.30
Finally, Professor David Rudenstine believes that since the
end of World War II, the Supreme Court has employed various
legal doctrines to insulate executive action from meaningful
judicial review in cases the executive asserts implicate national
security.31 These doctrines include the state secrets privilege,
standing requirements, the quasi-immunity defense, as well as
24

Id. at 201.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 677 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 77.
27
Professor Sunstein places minimalism in contradistinction to two other
competing approaches: national security maximalism and liberty maximalism.
National security maximalists believe the Constitution requires a highly deferential
role for the judiciary when the nation’s security is threatened. Id. at 49–50.
Conversely, liberty maximalists “insist that in times of war, at least as much as in
times of peace, federal judges must protect constitutional liberty.” Id. On this
spectrum, judicial minimalism lies somewhere in the middle.
28
Id. at 77.
29
Professor Sunstein argues the following cases illustrate his minimalist
approach to decision making during war time: Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958);
The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); and Ex parte Endo, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 79–83.
30
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 109.
31
DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE AGE OF DEFERENCE: THE SUPREME COURT,
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 3–4 (2016).
25
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heightened pleading rules. All of these, Rudenstine argues,
combine to deny judicial relief to individuals whose rights may
have been violated, immunize controversial executive conduct
from judicial review, and permit excess secrecy in judicial
proceedings.32 According to Rudenstine, this “age of deference”
has diminished transparency and undermined the nation’s
commitment to rule of law and checks and balances.33
Professor Rudenstine is careful to note that judicial
deference is not a reaction to the attacks on September 11, 2001,
and the cases he describes span the twentieth century. That
said, in the aftermath of September 11, judges have deferred to
executive designations of foreign organizations as terrorist
organizations,34 limited Freedom of Information Act requests
when they have implicated national security concerns,35 and
respected
joint
executive-legislative
fact-findings
when
interpreting the statute prohibiting material support for
terrorists.36 This hardly seems surprising, as these issues would
appear to involve precisely the type of national security decisions
that federal judges would leave to the political branches.37
32

Id. at 4.
Id. at 7, 9.
34
People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 111 (1948)) (holding the question of whether the terrorist activity of the
organization threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the
United States a nonjusticiable question because questions concerning the foreign
policy decisions of the executive branch present political judgments, “decisions of a
kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and
have long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial
intrusion or inquiry”) (internal citations omitted).
35
Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 932 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (“[I]n undertaking a deferential review we simply recognize the different roles
underlying the constitutional separation of powers. It is within the role of the
executive to acquire and exercise the expertise of protecting national security. It is
not within the role of the courts to second-guess executive judgments made in
furtherance of that branch's proper role.”); see also ACLU v. Dep’t of Justice, 321 F.
Supp. 2d 24, 35 (D.D.C. 2004) (deferring to government judgment that requested
information should be exempted from Freedom of Information Act request).
36
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–34 (2010) (“That
evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress's assessment, is entitled to
deference. This litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national
security and foreign affairs.”).
37
LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 176–77
(2010) [hereinafter MILITARY JUSTICE]; Statement of Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Principal
Deputy General Counsel Department of Defense, reprinted in 76 TERRORISM:
DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 215 (2007).
33
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Nonetheless, the only Supreme Court decision to squarely
address the legality of the military commissions convened by the
George W. Bush administration to try alleged terrorists was
anything but deferential.38 To explain why, Part II of this Note
provides a history of military commissions, focusing specifically
on the development of the current system in operation at
Guantánamo Bay.
II. MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
As long as there are armed conflicts, there will likely be
military commissions in one form or another.39 This Part
chronicles the history of military commissions in the United
States from the Mexican-American War to the aftermath of
September 11, 2001. Next, it examines the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld to strike down the military
commissions as constituted under the Bush administration.
Finally, this Part describes Congress’s response to the Hamdan
decision, as well as the current system of military commissions
under the Military Commissions Act of 2009, paying specific
attention to their composition and appellate review structure.
A.

Commissions through Early American History

A military commission is convened as an “incident to the
conduct of war” in order “to seize and subject to disciplinary
measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or
impede our military effort have violated the law of war.”40 It is

38

See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
Gary D. Solis, Contemporary Law of War and Military Commissions, in
GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL COURTS AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 73, 73 (Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Oren Gross eds., 2013)
(outlining the evolution of military commissions); see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590
(“The military commission . . . was born of military necessity”); Madsen v. Kinsella,
343 U.S. 341, 346–47 (1952) (“Since our nation’s earliest days, [military]
commissions have been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many
urgent governmental responsibilities related to war.”). But see Carol L. Chomsky,
Military Commissions in Historical Perspective: Lessons from the United States –
Dakota War Trials, in GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL COURTS AND
MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra, at 55, 55
(“Throughout American history, military commissions had been used irregularly and
rarely . . . .”).
40
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 596 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942)). This type of commission is distinct from those
commissions used in place of civilian courts when martial law has been declared,
39
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generally accepted that General Winfield Scott convened the first
military commissions in the United States in 1847 to maintain
order during America’s occupation of Mexico in the littlediscussed Mexican War.41 Their use was expanded during the
Civil War, and even “flourished.”42 Although more than 2,000
commissions were convened during the Civil War, the two cases
that attracted the most public attention involved northerners
who were sympathetic to the Confederacy but did not take up
arms against the government.43
In United States v.
Vallandigham,44 the Court reviewed a commission convened by
Union General Ambrose Burnside to try Clement Vallandigham,
a former Congressman from Ohio, for expressing sympathy for
the South.45
The Supreme Court indirectly upheld
Vallandigham’s conviction, holding the military commissions
and those in operation during a military occupation. Id. at 595–96. It is also distinct
from courts-martial.
41
See David Glazier, Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging
the 21st Century Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005, 2027 (2003) (“It is
generally agreed that the real origin of the military commission dates from the
Mexican War of 1846–1848.”) (citing WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 832–33 (2d ed. rev. 1920)); MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 179–
83; LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN
REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 32–35 (2005) [hereinafter MILITARY
TRIBUNALS]. There were instances predating the Mexican War where military
commissions were convened, most notably by George Washington to determine
whether Major Andre, alleged to be a British spy, was guilty of espionage, and by
General Andrew Jackson during the War of 1812 in New Orleans and during the
First Seminole War. See MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 179; MILITARY
TRIBUNALS, supra, at 27–33.
42
See Solis, supra note 39, at 76–77. The military commissions employed by the
Lincoln administration were not based on the General Scott’s model, but rather the
“versatile Missouri model” crafted by Henry Halleck in the critical border state of
Missouri to combat anti-union insurgents at the onset of the Civil War. Gideon M.
Hart, Military Commissions and the Lieber Code: Toward a New Understanding of
the Jurisdictional Foundations of Military Commissions, 203 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8–22
(2010). Halleck expanded the jurisdiction of the commissions to include all of those
offenses constituting violations of the laws of war. Id. The Department of War built
on Halleck’s innovation and more fully delineated the laws of war in the Lieber
Code. Id. Today’s military commissions are a descendent of the Civil War-era Lieber
Code. See Solis, supra note 39, at 76. For a discussion of the Lieber Code and its
imprint on military commissions in the United States and beyond, see MILITARY
TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 75–80.
43
MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 183.
44
68 U.S. 243 (1863).
45
MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 56. Vallandigham was an experienced
trial lawyer, and he was given the opportunity to call witnesses, cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution, had the assistance of counsel, and called a witness on
his own behalf. Id. (citing Vallandigham, 68 U.S. at 243, 244).
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could not be reviewed by the ordinary federal appellate courts.46
After the Civil War had ended, however, the Supreme Court
concluded that military commissions could not try a U.S. citizen,
Lamdin Milligan, for domestic offenses—in that case,
conspiracy—when the civilian state courts were open and
operating.47
B.

Commissions during World War II

Military commissions were not employed during World War
I, but World War II “saw hundreds of commissions convened in
both the European and Pacific theaters.”49 Again, two highprofile Supreme Court decisions stand out: Ex parte Quirin50 and
In re Yamashita.51 In both, the Supreme Court relied upon
explicit congressional authorization for trials by military
tribunals.52 Quirin involved the trial of eight German-born
48

46

MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 184.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). The decision was unanimous, but four
justices concurred in the opinion because they believed that commissions could be
convened even when the ordinary courts were open, as “Congress had power, though
not exercised, to authorize the military commission which was held in Indiana.” Id.
at 87. The emphasis on congressional sanction is noteworthy, especially in light of
the decisions in Hamdan and Al-Nashiri II. Notwithstanding the setback, military
commissions continued to function in the South under martial law during
Reconstruction. MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 59.
48
MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 186 (discussing Attorney General
Thomas Watt Gregory’s decision not to employ a commission to try Pable Waberski,
a Russian national suspected of sabotage).
49
Id. at 188.
50
317 U.S. 1 (1942).
51
327 U.S. 1 (1946).
52
See, e.g., Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28 (“By the Articles of War, and especially
Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so,
that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the
law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the
government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional
limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses
which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more
particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals.”); Yamashita, 327 U.S.
at 12 (“The war power, from which the commission derives its existence, is not
limited to victories in the field, but carries with it the inherent power to guard
against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy, at least in ways
Congress has recognized, the evils which the military operations have produced.”)
(emphasis added). The proposition that military commissions require express
congressional authorization was picked up by the Hamdan Court, which noted the
authority to establish and use penal tribunes, such as the current military
47
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saboteurs who had been captured after landing on U.S. soil with
plans to cause destruction.53
In response to the agents’
infiltration, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a
proclamation54 creating the military commission and
supplemented it with a military order in which he appointed
members of the tribunal, the prosecutors, and defense counsel.55
The Supreme Court issued a short per curiam decision that
allowed the commission to proceed, before rendering a fullthroated opinion a few months later, unanimously upholding
President Roosevelt’s commission as valid—by then, three
months had passed and six of the saboteurs had already been
executed by electrocution.56
The United States continued to employ commissions even
after the conflict ended, most notably to try General Tomoyuki
Yamashita, a senior leader of Japan’s Imperial Army.57 The
Supreme Court validated the commission convened to try
Yamashita as an appropriate mechanism and rejected the
defense’s argument that the Geneva Conventions required
Yamashita’s trial to proceed through a court-martial.58
Importantly, the Court deferred to the commission’s factual
findings, limiting its review to questions of law.59

commissions, “can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the President and
Congress in time of war.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006).
53
MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 187. The German saboteurs, two of
whom were U.S. citizens, were charged with violating the law of war, the Articles of
War, and conspiracy. See MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 103–06 (discussing
the charges).
54
Proclamation 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942).
55
MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 99 (citing 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7,
1942)).
56
Id. at 114. The Court’s central holding in Quirin is that “lawful combatants”
and “unlawful combatants” are “subject to capture and detention” for the duration of
hostilities, but “unlawful combatants” are also “subject to trial and punishment by
military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful”; in this
instance, for espionage, which is a violation of the laws of war. Quirin, 317 U.S. at
31. The Court also distinguished the case of the Nazi saboteurs from that of Lamdin
Milligan who, unlike the saboteurs, had never joined the Confederates and therefore
was not a part of a conventional military. Id. at 45.
57
MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 188.
58
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 24 (1946).
59
Id. at 8; MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 147.
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The end of World War II brought about the Nuremberg
Trials and immense changes in the international community’s
approach to the law of armed conflict.60 These developments
implicated the lawful use of military commissions, but because
the United States did not employ military commissions during
the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, these implications were not
brought to bear until the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.61
C.

Military Commissions During the Bush Administration

On September 11, 2001, agents of the al Qaida terrorist
group hijacked commercial airplanes and attacked the World
Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington,
Virginia.62 So began the longest war in American history.63 In
response to these tragic attacks, Congress passed the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), which
authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate
force” against those “nations, organizations, or persons” that

60
See Solis, supra note 39, at 81 (“The most significant innovation was the 1949
Geneva Conventions.”). To be certain, the Nuremberg Trials were not military
commissions. They were convened by an international coalition—rather than by the
United States under its own sovereign authority—for the specific purpose of
bringing to justice Nazi leaders. MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 189.
61
Solis, supra note 39, at 84.
62
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567–68 (2006). A fourth hijacked plane
crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
63
Jack Goldsmith & Matthew C. Waxman, The Other Forever War, TIME (Sept.
10, 2016), http://time.com/4486572/forever-war-islamic-state-isis/; Edmonds v. Dep’t
of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 82 n.7 (2004) (“[T]he imminent threat of terrorism
will not be eliminated anytime in the foreseeable future, but is an endeavor that will
consume our nation’s attention indefinitely.”). Perhaps the dreadful prospect of
perpetual warfare is best expressed poetically:
What? War
as a living text? Cyberwar and permanent
war, Third Wave War, neocortical war,
Sixth Generation War, Fourth Epoch
War, pure war and war of computers
to process it, systems
to represent it, war of myth
and metaphor, of trope and assent,
war of hundreds of millions of televisions
assuring it, hundreds of billions
of dollars, a PK machine gun or two, a few
gunmen you can hire cheap, with their own
Kalashnikovs. Now . . . What now?
Lawrence Joseph, Rubaiyat, FSG WORK IN PROGRESS, http://www.fsgworkinprogress
.com/2015/04/rubaiyat/.
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orchestrated the September 11 attacks.64 In addition, the AUMF
served as the basis for the government’s counterterrorism
detention authority.65 Pursuant to the AUMF, President Bush
issued a Military Order66 authorizing the military to detain
“member[s] of the organization known as al Qaida” and those
who assisted or harbored them.67
Pursuant to President Bush’s order, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld promulgated rules and procedures for the commissions.
Defendants in these commissions received the following
protections:


“The right to military defense counsel upon being charged
with a listed offense”;
 “The right to civilian counsel of choice,” to be paid for by
the defendant;
68
 “The privilege against self-incrimination at trial”;

64

Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The AUMF provides in full:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.
65
See Adam R. Pearlman, Meaningful Review and Process Due: How
Guantanamo Detention Is Changing the Battlefield, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 255,
270 (2015); see also Obaydullah v. Obama, 688 F.3d 784, 791 (2012) (“As this court
has now repeatedly held, the AUMF gives the United States government the
authority to detain a person who is found to have been part of al Qaeda or Taliban
forces . . . and Congress has since affirmed that authority.”) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Al Alwi v. Obama 653 F.3d 11, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The Obama
administration relied on the AUMF as the President’s sole source of power to detain
enemy belligerents. See Walter E. Kuhn, The Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act:
Detention Policy and Political Reality, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 221, 227 (2011).
66
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). President Bush followed the
precedent set by President Roosevelt in styling the order as a military order, which
“was intended to emphasize that it came from the president as commander-in-chief,
not merely as head of the executive branch.” MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at
191.
67
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,834.
68
The privilege was not extended to detainees before trial because the
government maintained that it would inhibit intelligence gathering and would prove
unworkable overseas. MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 191. The rules did forbid
a commission from drawing a negative inference from a decision not to testify,
however, a prohibition not followed in some European countries. Id.
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“The right to a copy of all charges and supporting
documents, translated to the accused’s native language”;
and
 The right to a trial open to the public: Before closing any
proceeding to the public, the government was required
to make a showing to the presiding official that, for
example, closed proceedings were necessary to protect
against the dissemination of classified information.69

Moreover, and in line with military practice, the
commissions required a two-thirds vote to convict in non-capital
cases, and a unanimous vote to impose the death penalty.70 The
Department of Defense also promulgated a list of offenses,71
provided for review panels,72 and took care of other ancillary
matters, such as defining the qualifications for defense counsel.73
At first, the commissions did not provide appellate review in a
federal court; nor were detainees thought to have access to the
extraordinary relief of habeas corpus.74
69
This list is drawn from MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 191–92. A
consistent critique of the commissions is their lax rules of evidence, particularly
hearsay evidence, and the commission’s ability to exclude the accused from
proceedings and deny his access to evidence in certain circumstances. See, e.g.,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613–16 (2006); Statement of Lt. Commander
Charles Swift, Office of Chief Def. Counsel, Office of Military Comm’ns, U.S.
Department of Defense, reprinted in 76 TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
AND LOCAL CONTROL 330–34 (2007).
70
MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 191–92.
71
MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 181. In this regard, the commissions
convened by President Bush resemble those convened by General Winfield Scott’s
order of 1847: Both delineated the crimes over which the commission would have
jurisdiction and limited the crimes to those that could not be tried in a court-martial
and to punishments available in U.S. civilian courts. MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note
37, at 180.
72
MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 184–85.
73
Id. at 184.
74
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,836 (Nov. 13, 2001). This presumption was not
unfounded. See, e.g., Pearlman, supra note 65, at 268 (“In light of this precedent,
especially Eisentrager, and based on government arguments presented in court
filings, when the first Operation Enduring Freedom detainees arrived at
Guantánamo Bay in January 2002, it seems the government never expected that the
detainees would be able to use U.S. federal courts to challenge the lawfulness of
their detention.”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“The Commander in Chief and his subordinates had every reason to expect that the
internment of combatants at Guantanamo Bay would not have the consequence of
bringing the cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts into military affairs.”).
President Roosevelt, too, was intent on keeping the Nazi saboteurs out of the civilian
court system, at one point telling his Attorney General Francis Biddle, “I won’t give
them up. . . . I won’t hand them over to any United States marshal armed with a
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This proved not to be the case.75 In the face of several
lawsuits, Congress made significant changes to the system in an
attempt to shore up the commissions and insulate them from
collateral review in federal court. With the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (“DTA”),76 Congress amended the federal habeas
statute to provide that “no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the

writ of habeas corpus. Understand?” MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 41, at 99
(quoting FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 331 (1962)).
75
The Supreme Court first began to chip away at executive assertions of
wartime authority to limit detainee access to the federal court system through
habeas petitions in 2004 with its decisions in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
In Rasul, the Court held that the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, extends
to aliens detained by the United States in Guantánamo Bay, concluding, “[a]liens
held at the base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal
court’s authority under § 2241.” 542 U.S. at 466, 481. In Hamdi, a plurality of the
Court affirmed that through the AUMF, Congress had authorized the detention of
those persons who joined supporting forces hostile to the United States in
Afghanistan and who engaged in armed conflict against the United States. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). It described this power as a “fundamental and
accepted . . . incident to war.” Id. However, when the government detains a U.S.
citizen, the Court held that due process required more robust procedural protections
in the determination of that individual’s status as an enemy combatant than the
executive had provided. Id. at 533. Nevertheless, and in what has become a theme in
the Court’s terrorism cases, the Court left the door open for Congress to fix the issue:
“There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met
by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.” Id. at
538. The Deputy Secretary of Defense took the Hamdi plurality’s cue and
established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”) to determine whether
individuals detained at Guantánamo were in fact “enemy combatants” as defined by
the Department. Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. on Order Establishing
Combatant Status Review Tribunal to the Sec’y of the Navy (July 7, 2004),
https://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/MuneerAhmad_ExhibitV.pdf.
“A
Combatant Status Review Tribunal . . . is a one-time administrative process
designed to determine whether each detainee under the control of the Department of
Defense at Guantanamo meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy
combatant.” DEP’T OF DEF., COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL, (2006),
http://archive.defense.gov/news/Oct2006/d20061017CSRT.pdf.
The
Government
maintained that these procedures were designed to comply with the due process
requirements identified by the plurality in Hamdi. See Pearlman, supra note 65, at
271.
76
Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-148, 119 Stat. 2680; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Exceptional Courts and the
Structure of American Military Justice, in GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL
COURTS AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 39,
at 163, 172 (“It was the Court’s grant of certiorari in Hamdan . . . that precipitated
[the DTA].”).
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Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba . . . .”77
Instead, the statute provided statutory appeal to the D.C. Circuit
in certain instances, including appeal as of right in capital cases
or where the detainee was sentenced to a prison term of ten years
or more.78 When the legality of the Bush military commissions
was finally before the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
the Court was unimpressed with this last-minute addition to the
commission’s appellate review procedures,79 ruling instead by a
slim 5-to-4 majority that the commission convened to try
Hamdan lacked the power to proceed. The decision provoked an
aggressive response from Congress.
D. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
The Hamdan decision is noteworthy if for no other reason
than for the number of issues on which the Court divided.80
Justice Stevens’ majority found no constitutional defect with the
77
Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2680 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
The act also addressed certain detainee-related issues. For example, it placed
restrictions on the treatment and interrogation of detainees in U.S. custody.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572 (2006).
78
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2012), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008). Review was left to the discretion of the D.C. Circuit and was itself
circumscribed, limited to:
Whether the final decision was consistent with the standards and
procedures specified in the military order referred to in subparagraph (A);
and
The extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable,
whether the use of such standards and procedures to reach the final
decision is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Id.
79
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 616 (“[B]ecause Hamdan apparently is not subject to
the death penalty (at least as matters now stand) and may receive a sentence
shorter than 10 years’ imprisonment, he has no automatic right to review of the
commission’s ‘final decision.’ ”); id. at 650 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is no answer
that, at the end of the day, the [DTA] affords military-commission defendants the
opportunity for judicial review in federal court. As the Court is correct to observe,
the scope of that review is limited.”).
80
“The Justices divided over (1) the Court’s jurisdiction (5–3); (2) abstention (5–
3); (3) the legality of using military commissions to try a conspiracy charge (4–3);
(4) the legality of using a military commission lacking the rules and procedures of
courts-martial (5–3); (5) the enforceability of the Geneva Conventions (5–2); (6) the
applicability of Common Article 3 to the war with al Qaeda (5–2); and (7) the
meaning of Common Article 3 (5–3).” Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles
and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23.
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military commissions; its decision to invalidate the commissions
was based solely on its interpretation of federal statutes and
international treaties. The Court read these statutes as an
expression of Congress placing limitations on the President’s
ability to convene military commissions, thus presenting a
“conflict between Presidential and congressional action.”81
Consequently, the Court acknowledged that congressional
authorization could cure the defects it identified and invited
legislative action.82
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld involved the trial of Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, a Yemeni national who served as bodyguard and
personal driver to Osama bin Laden, and who was selected for
trial by military commission in 2003 for his alleged conspiracy.83
His appeal reached the Supreme Court in 2006.84 First, the
Court dodged the DTA’s jurisdiction stripping provision, holding
that Subsection (e) of § 1005 of the DTA did not apply to cases
pending when the DTA was enacted.85 The Court reasoned that
it retained jurisdiction, because Hamdan’s petition had been filed
and left unresolved before the DTA’s enactment.86 After dealing
with the jurisdictional question, the Court rejected the
Government’s request that it abstain from adjudicating
Hamdan’s petition for writ of habeas corpus until the military
commission had rendered its final judgment.87 It then moved to
the merits.
81

Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 639 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing the case falls
within Justice Jackson’s third category in The Steel Seizure Case); id. at 636 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (“Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to
create military commissions of the kind at issue here.”).
82
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the
President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”);
Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of
Powers after Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 961 (2007) (“In
the three opinions supporting the [Hamdan] result, the one constant was the
emphasis on empowering Congress.”).
83
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 569–70.
84
Id. at 570.
85
Id. at 575–76.
86
Id. But see id. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding the Constitution’s
Exceptions Clause (Art. III, § 2) “permits exactly what Congress had done here” with
the DTA).
87
The Hamdan abstention decision will be scrutinized more closely in the
following Part, but it is worth pausing to consider Professor Sunstein’s remarks on
the question of abstention: “In view of the novelty and delicacy of the underlying
questions, a great deal can be said on behalf of a genuinely minimalist course:
abstention.” Sunstein, supra note 80, at 34. This approach would have avoided
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The Court first concluded that neither the AUMF nor the
DTA provided specific, congressional authorization for the
military commissions at issue.88 As a result, the Court turned to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) and determined
that the President’s use of military commissions is conditioned on
compliance with the UCMJ itself, in addition to the American
common law of war, and the Geneva Conventions.89 Having set
forth this rule of law, the Court determined that the current
system of military commissions violated all three.90
First, the Court concluded that the President promulgated
rules of procedure that departed from those used in courtsmartial without adequately demonstrating why the court-martial
rules would be impracticable under the circumstances.91 The
Court viewed the rules of procedures that permitted commissions
to exclude the accused from proceedings, denied him access to
evidence in certain circumstances, and deviated from evidentiary
rules used in courts-martial, such as those governing hearsay, as
particularly problematic because they were inconsistent with the
UCMJ.92 Focusing on two provisions in the UCMJ, Articles 36(a)
and 36(b),93 the Court concluded that the former required the
thorny questions surrounding the AUMF, the UCMJ, and the Geneva Conventions.
Id. Furthermore, had the Court abstained, “it would have had an opportunity to
resolve the central questions after a trial, and thus after learning about the actual
(rather than hypothesized) nature of the particular procedures.” Id. at 35. In light of
this, “the course of abstention would have had many virtues.” Id. at 36.
88
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593–94. This reading is “an extremely cramped and
unworkable interpretation of the expansive authorization that Congress gave the
President in the AUMF,” according to the former United States Solicitor General
Theodore Olson. Testimony of Theodore B. Olson, Former U.S. Solicitor General,
reprinted in 76 TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL,
221 (2007) [hereinafter Testimony of Theodore B. Olson]. Because the Court already
construed the AUMF as authorizing the President to exercise his war powers, see
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004), a “rational and reasonable reading of
the AUMF is that it endorsed the President’s . . . establishment of the military
commissions.” Testimony of Theodore B. Olson, supra.
89
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 584–85.
90
Justice Stevens lost Justice Kennedy on whether trying enemy combatants
for conspiracy was a violation of the American common law of war.
91
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620.
92
Id. at 621–22. For a helpful chart comparing procedural rights in courtsmartial, the Bush military commissions, the Nuremberg Trials, and the ad-hoc
tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, see 76 TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 255–75 (2007); see also supra note 69.
93
The two provisions read as follows:
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for
cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military

FINAL_DIMARCO

2017]

3/25/2018 6:26 PM

THE VIRTUES OF ABSTENTION

721

President to determine that it would be impracticable to apply in
the military commission the rules and principles of law that
govern trial in federal district courts, and the latter required an
additional impracticability judgment regarding the application of
court-martial rules in the military commission setting.94 Because
the Court was unsatisfied with the President’s showing of
impracticability, the Court concluded that the commissions
violated the uniformity principle codified in Article 36(b) of the
UCMJ.95
The Court also found that Article 21 of the UCMJ required
the commissions to comply with the laws of war, which it
concluded incorporated the Geneva Conventions and the Hague
Convention, overturning the contrary conclusion by the Court of
Appeals.96 The Court first determined that Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions applied to agents of al Qaida, a stateless
terrorist group.97 This conclusion triggered Common Article 3’s
requirement that Hamdan be tried in a “regularly constituted
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples.”98 Circling back to its
assessment of the commissions as violative of the UCMJ, the
commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of
inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so
far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
States district courts, but which may not, except as provided in chapter 47A
of this title, be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform
insofar as practicable, except insofar as applicable to military commissions
established under chapter 47A of this title.
10 U.S.C. § 836 (2012) (emphasis added).
94
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622–23; id. at 639–40 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95
Id. at 624 (majority opinion). Specifically, the Court found the President did
not make a satisfactory determination that it would be impracticable to apply the
rules for courts-martial, violating subsection (b). Id. at 623.
96
Id. at 625–26.
97
Id. at 631–32. But see Statement of Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, reprinted in 76
TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 211 (2007) (“The
United States has never before applied common Article 3 in the context of an armed
conflict with international terrorists. When the Geneva Conventions were concluded
in 1949, of course, the drafters of the Conventions certainly did not anticipate, and
did not agree to cover, armed conflicts with international terrorist organizations
such as al Qaeda.”).
98
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631–32 (2006) (quoting Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, (1955)
6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, T.I.A.S. No. 3364).
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Court explained that the commissions could only be considered
“regularly constituted court[s]” if they followed the standards of
military justice set forth in the court-martial process.99 Adopted
without sufficient explanation from the President, the Court
reiterated the structural and procedural deficiencies it had found
and held that the commission convened to try Hamdan did not
meet the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.100
The Hamdan decision was a significant defeat for the Bush
administration.
It did not, of course, find that military
commissions are unconstitutional as a general matter, only that
the ones employed by the Bush administration to prosecute
terrorists were in conflict with congressional statutes limiting
their use.
Interestingly, this putative conflict between
congressional concerns and the executive’s actions did not reflect
on-the-ground realities in 2006. Congress responded rapidly to
Hamdan by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(“2006 MCA”),101 which undid much of the Hamdan holding and
took the unusually aggressive step of completely eliminating the
Court’s jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from Guantánamo
detainees.102
E.

The Military Commissions Acts and Commissions Under the
Obama Administration

The Hamdan decision was issued on June 29, 2006; the
House Armed Services Committee commenced hearings on the
subject on July 12, 2006.103 Before the year had ended, Congress
passed the 2006 MCA, which President Bush signed into law in
October.104

99

Id. at 632–34. But see id. at 715 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 634 (majority opinion). But see id. at 725 (Alito, J., dissenting).
101
Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006)
(codified as amended in scattered sections in 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
102
The jurisdiction-stripping provision that resulted from Hamdan ended with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, where the Court held that the
provision operated as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
103
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Blocks Guantánamo Tribunals, N.Y.
TIMES (June 29, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/29/washington/29cnd-scot
us.html.
104
Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing S. 3930, 2006
U.S.C.C.A.N. S61 (Oct. 17, 2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court ruled that the military
100
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Taking the Hamdan Court’s cue, Congress patterned the
military commissions under the 2006 MCA after courts-martial
under the UCMJ.105 That said, the 2006 MCA largely exempted
commissions from the requirements of the UCMJ—notably, the
speedy trial requirements106—and the Geneva Conventions.107
The statute also provided for more robust appellate review and
It
enhanced evidentiary rules in favor of the accused.108
authorized the Secretary of Defense to establish an intermediate
appellate tribunal, the Court of Military Commission Review
(“CMCR”), whose decisions were to be reviewed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.109
Moreover, the statute aligned the rules governing hearsay with
those used in courts-martial, providing the accused with an
opportunity to prove that hearsay evidence, not otherwise
admissible in courts-martial, should be excluded because it is
“unreliable or lacking in probative value.”110 Finally, Congress
incorporated a slightly modified version of the Classified
Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”) to govern the handling of
classified information and the procedures governing closed
sessions.111

commissions needed to be explicitly authorized by the United States Congress. And
so I asked Congress for that authority, and they have provided it.”).
105
MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 193; Vladeck, supra note 76, at 165.
106
10 U.S.C. § 948b(d)(1)(A) (2012).
107
Id. § 948b(g).
108
Id. § 950c.
109
Id. § 950g(a). This procedure was similar to the courts-martial appeals
process. Commission convictions would be automatically reviewable by CMCR, just
as courts-martial decisions are reviewable by the Courts of Criminal Appeals of the
Armed Forces. MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 193. CMCR decisions could then
be appealed through the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
and then to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and finally by petition to the Supreme
Court. Id.
110
10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(E) (2012). Additionally, the Government was required
to produce exculpatory documents. Cf. Statement of Lt. Commander Charles Swift,
Office of Chief Def. Counsel, Office of Military Comm’ns, U.S. Department of
Defense, reprinted in 76 TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL
CONTROL 331 (2007) (arguing that under the Bush administration commission rules,
“the Prosecution had no obligation to disclose evidence from other government
agencies suggesting the defendant was innocent”).
111
MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 193; see also 10 U.S.C. § 949d(c) (2012).
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When Barack Obama assumed office in 2008, the future of
the military commissions at Guantánamo became uncertain,
given the new President’s oft-stated opposition to Guantánamo.112
But after initially promising to close the detention facility at
Guantánamo Bay indefinitely, President Obama sought to reform
and utilize the military commissions rather than dismantle
them.113 Congress obliged and revised the 2006 MCA in 2009.114
The amendments added several procedural protections for enemy
combatants, expanded the availability of appellate review,115 and
altered the structure of the CMCR, requiring it to be composed of
both military and civilian judges who are appointed by the
president with the advice and consent of the Senate.116 It also
enhanced the rights of an accused in certain ways, such as by
more
closely
defining
hearsay.117
The

112
See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4899 (Jan. 22, 2009)
(temporarily suspending the operations of the Guantánamo Bay military
commissions).
113
See Editorial, The Prison that Won't Go Away, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/opinion/09wed2.html. Indeed, President Obama
cleared military prosecutors at Guantánamo in 2011 to try five detainees. See
Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/us/05gitmo.html. The change of policy
was never a change of heart, of course, and President Obama never stopped calling
for Guantánamo’s closure. Jens David Ohlin, One More Time All Together: Obama
Wants To Close Gitmo, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 23, 2016, 11:01 AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2016/02/23/32410/. In fairness, the former President’s political
statements regarding Guantánamo do little justice to his views on the use of
military commissions, which are nuanced. See, e.g., President Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President on National Security, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (May 21, 2009,
10:28
AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-national-security-5-21-09 (“Military commissions have a history in the
United States dating back to George Washington and the Revolutionary War. They
are an appropriate venue for trying detainees for violations of the laws of war. They
allow for the protection of sensitive sources and methods of intelligence-gathering;
they allow for the safety and security of participants; and for the presentation of
evidence gathered from the battlefield that cannot always be effectively presented in
federal courts.”).
114
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Pub. L. No. 111-84,
123 Stat. 2190, 2574-614 (2009).
115
Vladeck, supra note 76, at 174.
116
10 U.S.C. § 950f (2012).
117
See Solis, supra note 39, at 89. The 2009 MCA also prohibited the use of
statements made under torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Id.
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ultimate result of the 2009 amendments was “to produce a
structure that closely (and intentionally) mirrors the current
structure for direct and collateral review of courts-martial.”118
In short, the congressional response in the form of the MCA
provided the express legislative sanction of military commissions
that the Hamdan Court requested and provided for a robust
appeals process to federal court. These changes set the stage for
Al-Nashiri II, where a panel of judges deferred to the military
commissions, arguing that “[m]uch has changed since
Hamdan.”119 As the foregoing makes clear, “[t]he current system
of military commissions at Guantanamo Bay ‘is the product of an
extended dialogue among the President, the Congress, and the
Supreme Court.’ ”120 That dialogue is on full display in the recent
decision by the D.C. Circuit in Al-Nashiri II.
III. AL-NASHIRI II
In the present round of litigation,121 al-Nashiri argued that
the offenses for which he has been charged122 are not “triable” by
a military commission under the MCA because they were not
118

Vladeck, supra note 76, at 175; see also Glazier, supra note 41, at 2024
(“[H]istorical analysis and the writings of military justice commentators reveal an
original practice of close conformity between the procedures of [courts-martial and
military commissions].”).
119
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
120
Id. at 114 (quoting Al-Nashiri I, 791 F.3d 71, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2015)); see also Ori
Aronson, In/visible Courts: Military Tribunals as Other Spaces, in SECRECY,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE VINDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 229, 232
(David Cole et al. eds., 2013) (“The decade since [September 11, 2001] has witnessed
an ongoing inter-branch process of recalibration of the procedural, institutional, and
constitutional elements of the reinvented military commissions system, including
several rounds of legislation, judicial review, and executive policy adjustments.”).
121
See discussion supra note 4.
122
Al-Nashiri has been charged with the following:
(1) using treachery or perfidy
(2) murder in violation of the law of war
(3) attempted murder in violation of the law of war
(4) terrorism
(5) conspiracy
(6) intentionally causing serious bodily injury
(7) attacking civilians
(8) attacking civilian objects
(9) hijacking or hazarding a vessel or aircraft.
Charge Sheet at 3–5, 10, 12, United States v. al-Nashiri, Charge Sheet (Mil.
Comm’ns Trial Judiciary Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alN
ashiri2/Al%20Nashiri%20II%20(Referred%20Charges).pdf. “The government is
seeking the death penalty.” Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 114.
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“committed in the context of . . . hostilities,” which is a
prerequisite for the military commission’s exercise of jurisdiction
under the 2009 MCA.123
The court did not reach the
jurisdictional question, however, opting to apply Councilman
abstention to the military commission convened to try al-Nashiri.
Before evaluating the court’s extension of Councilman to the
military commissions, the next Section outlines the underlying
jurisdictional question raised by counsel for al-Nashiri.
A.

The Underlying Jurisdictional Question

As Judge Griffith noted at the beginning of his analysis, AlNashiri II presented a relatively narrow question.124
The
petitioner did not challenge “the structural or procedural
features of the military commissions created by Congress,” nor
did he claim that the “commissions are unconstitutional” or that
he was improperly classified as an “alien unprivileged enemy
belligerent.”125 Instead, al-Nashiri’s petition126 challenged only
the commission’s authority to try him for the crimes he is alleged
to have committed before September 11, 2001.
The 2009 MCA authorizes the President “to establish
military commissions . . . for offenses triable by military
commission.”127 Offenses are triable by military commission
“only if the offense is committed in the context of and associated
with hostilities.”128 The statute further defined hostilities as “any
conflict subject to the laws of war.”129 The jurisdiction question
turns, then, on how the court will define the “context of

123
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 116. A military judge denied the same arguments
on a motion to dismiss in 2012, reasoning that “the existence of hostilities was a
mixed question of law and fact” to be proven by the government at trial. Id. For a
critique of the commission’s jurisdictional decision, authored by Judge Pohl, see
Keven Jon Heller, Judge Pohl: The US and AQ Were Engaged in Hostilities in 1775,
OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 16, 2013, 7:57 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/01/16/judge-pohlthe-us-and-aq-were-engaged-in-hostilities-in-1775/ (providing a link to the
commission decision).
124
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 116.
125
Id.
126
Al-Nashiri also sought mandamus relief, asking the court to dissolve the
military commission convened to try him on the ground that his alleged acts were
not committed in the context of hostilities. Id. at 117.
127
10 U.S.C. § 948b(b) (2012).
128
Id. § 950p(c) (2012).
129
Id. § 948a(9) (2012).
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hostilities.”130 In other words, when did the war with al Qaida
begin? Judge Griffith framed the disagreement between the
parties over how to answer this question as follows:
Should the existence of hostilities be determined based on the
totality of the circumstances, or only on the understanding of
the political branches? And may it be based on a retrospective
analysis or only on what decisionmakers believed at the time of
the events? Al-Nashiri and amici believe that the judgments of
the political branches at the time are what matters; the
Government takes a broader view.131

The court did not decide this weighty issue, however.
Instead, it extended Councilman abstention to the military
commission context and declined to adjudicate al-Nashiri’s
jurisdictional challenge, which will now be resolved by the
military commission in the first instance.132 The following
Section turns to the court’s abstention decision.

130
The “context of hostilities” question has attracted scholarly attention and is
beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Laurie Blank & Benjamin Farley,
Determining When the Armed Conflict with Al-Qaeda Started, JUST SECURITY (Mar.
11, 2016, 9:35 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/29898/determining-armed-conflictal-qaeda-started/; Laurie Blank & Benjamin R. Farley, Identifying the Start of
Conflict: Conflict Recognition, Operational Realities and Accountability in the Post
9/11 World, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 467 (2015). By charging several detainees,
including al-Nashiri, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and other 9/11 attackers, with war
crimes for conduct dating back to 1996, the United States has adopted the position
that the armed conflict with al Qaida began before 9/11. Id. at 491. The existence of
an armed conflict triggers the application of the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”), with
its attendant obligations. Id. at 469.
131
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Put simply, if hostilities did
not “exist” until after September 11, 2001, then al-Nashiri’s crimes, committed in
October 2000, are not triable by the military commissions under the 2009 MCA. The
Government takes a different view of the hostilities question, responding that the
existence of hostilities is established by considering the totality of the circumstances,
and that the Cole attack was part of al Qaida’s strategy to wage war against the
United States. Id. at 136. To the contrary, al-Nashiri asserts that hostilities exist
only when the political branches say so in a “contemporaneous public act”; al-Nashiri
is quick to note that President Clinton’s public statement in response to the Cole
bombing made clear that the nation was not at war. Id. But this position puts alNashiri in an awkward situation when it comes to the argument that the court
should not abstain, because for al-Nashiri, joint action by Congress and the
President is not sufficient for the court to abstain, Oral Argument at 14:30, AlNashiri II, 835 F.3d 110 (2016), https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/record
ings2016.nsf/77A3A67AD3EF915385257F5C006765E1/$file/15-1023.mp3, but joint
action by the political branches, in the form of a public statement or act of Congress,
is necessary to trigger the existence of hostilities.
132
Pursuant to the MCA, “[a] military commission is a competent tribunal to
make a finding sufficient for jurisdiction.” 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2012).
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Abstention Doctrine

The court’s abstention analysis involves a two-step inquiry:
(1) Does abstention doctrine apply to the military commissions
generally? And if so, (2) Do any of the exceptions identified in
abstention jurisprudence apply to al-Nashiri’s unique
circumstances?133 To understand the court’s answer to both
questions, a review of abstention doctrine is in order.
The doctrine of abstention first arose in the context of
criminal prosecutions as an exception to the “strict duty” that
federal courts have to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon
them by Congress.134 The general rule is that so long as the
defendant has an adequate remedy in the form of a trial and
direct appeal, federal courts should not exercise their equitable
discretion135 to enjoin ongoing state criminal proceedings.136 In
Younger v. Harris,137 the United States Supreme Court
established the current standard for applying abstention to state
criminal prosecutions by articulating two considerations that
favored abstention in the face of ongoing state criminal
proceedings: (1) the traditional rule that courts of equity should
not enjoin criminal prosecutions where an adequate remedy at
law exists,138 and (2) interests of comity, or “federalism,” that
ward against interference in ongoing state proceedings because it
would disrupt the careful balance between state and federal
power.139
Grounding its decision in Younger, the Court in Schlesinger
v. Councilman extended abstention doctrine to courts-martial.140
Councilman involved a court-martial convened to try an Army
officer for allegedly selling and possessing marijuana.141 The case
reached the Supreme Court after the defendant filed suit in a

133

Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 589 n.20 (2006).
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 118 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins., 517
U.S. 706, 716 (1996)).
135
The court describes the practice of abstaining as “a basic doctrine of equity
jurisprudence.” Id. at 118 (quoting Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2015));
see also Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 754 (1975) (describing abstention
as a “federal equity power”).
136
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 118 (citing Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 26).
137
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
138
Id. at 43–44.
139
Id. at 44–45.
140
Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757.
141
Id. at 741.
134
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federal district court to enjoin the court-martial proceeding on
the ground that the alleged offense was not “service connected,”
and as a result could not be tried in a court-martial.142
The Court acknowledged that the second consideration
outlined in Younger, that is, the interests of federalism, did not
apply to a court-martial proceeding, but further explained that
two “factors equally compelling” led to the conclusion that
abstention was proper.143 First, “military discipline” is best
served when the federal judicial system refrains from interfering
in the military justice system.144 Second, federal courts ought to
respect the balance that Congress struck between military
preparedness and fairness to individual service members when it
“created an integrated system of military courts and review
procedures.”145 An important component of this “respect” is the
assumption that the scheme Congress created will adequately
This
protect the constitutional rights of servicepersons.146
assumption makes clear that whether to abstain does not hinge
on an examination of the “on-the-ground performance of the
system that Congress and the Executive have established.”147
Nearly three decades later, the Court in Hamdan considered
whether to extend the principles set forth in Councilman to the
military commissions. It concluded that “neither of the comity
considerations identified in Councilman weighs in favor of
abstention in this case.”148 Dismissing the concern for “military
discipline,” the Court noted that Hamdan was not a member of
the armed forces.149 Turning to the second consideration, the
Court determined that unlike the court-martial convened to try
the serviceman in Councilman, “the tribunal convened to try
Hamdan is not part of the integrated system of military courts,
complete with independent review panels, that Congress has
142

Id.
Id. at 757.
144
Id. at 743, 757.
145
Id. at 757–58.
146
Id. at 758 (“[I]mplicit in the congressional scheme embodied in the [UCMJ] is
the view that the military court system generally is adequate to and responsibly will
perform its assigned task. We think this congressional judgment must be respected
and that it must be assumed that the military court system will vindicate
servicemen’s constitutional rights.”).
147
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Councilman, 420
U.S. at 758).
148
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 587 (2006).
149
Id.
143
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established.”150 In declining to abstain, the Court explained that
the government had not identified any “important countervailing
interest” to justify abstention.151 As a result, it concluded that Ex
parte Quirin, where the Court intervened in an ongoing military
commission, was the most relevant precedent.152
Nevertheless, the Hamdan Court narrowed its abstention
holding by declining to “foreclose the possibility that abstention
may be appropriate in some cases seeking review of ongoing
military commission proceedings. . . .”153 This language left an
opening for lower courts154 reviewing habeas petitions from
Guantánamo in the wake of Hamdan, and, in due course, for the
D.C. Circuit in Al-Nashiri II.
C.

Extending Councilman to the Military Commission Context

Having examined the Supreme Court’s abstention
jurisprudence, the court in Al-Nashiri II concluded that the
District Court had appropriately extended the principles
announced in Councilman to al-Nashiri’s case.155 First, Judge
Griffith pointed out that “[m]uch has changed since Hamdan.”156
Specifically, the enhanced procedural protections and rigorous
review mechanisms the Hamdan Court found lacking were
established when Congress passed the MCA, thus giving the
executive explicit authority to try enemy combatants by military
commission.157 Seeking guidance from Councilman’s “equally
150

Id. The Court pointed out specifically that Hamdan had no right to appeal
his conviction to a panel comprised of civilian judges who would be insulated from
military influence. Id.
151
Id. at 589. Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion also addressed the
government’s abstention argument, concluding abstention was appropriate. Id. at
672–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, Justice Scalia
found the “two considerations of comity” identified in Councilman—“the closest
analogue in our jurisprudence”—as well as a third consideration “all cut in favor of
abstention.” Id. at 673. He reasoned that the federal court system should avoid
“direct conflict with the Executive in an area where the Executive’s competence is
maximal and ours is virtually nonexistent,” a principle, grounded in “considerations
of interbranch comity,” that should have led the Court to abstain. Id. at 676–77.
152
Id. at 588–89 (majority opinion).
153
Id. at 590.
154
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136–37 (D.D.C. 2008); AlNashiri v. MacDonald, No. 11-5907 RJB, 2012 WL 1642306, at *11 (W.D. Wash. May
10, 2012) (“[U]nder the principles of abstention announced in Councilman, the court
should not exercise equitable jurisdiction.”).
155
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110, 118 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
156
Id. at 120.
157
Id. at 121.
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compelling” factors, the court evaluated the two comity
considerations in Councilman and distilled the following rule:
For Councilman abstention to apply, courts must “be assured of
both the adequacy of the alternative system” in protecting a
defendant’s rights, and the “importance of the interests served by
allowing that system to proceed uninterrupted by federal
courts.”158
Having crafted that rule, the court articulated two questions
that would guide its application: (1) Whether the system enacted
to adjudicate al-Nashiri’s guilt would adequately protect his
rights; and (2) Whether an “important countervailing interest”
justified the district court’s decision to avoid adjudicating a
pretrial challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of a military
commission created under the 2009 MCA.159
1.

Whether the MCA Will Adequately Protect Detainee Rights

The court was “convinced” of the adequacy of the 2009 MCA’s
review structure given its similarity to the review system for
courts-martial approved by Councilman.160 Judge Griffith first
listed the similarities: the composition and commission of the
military commissions “closely mirror[s]” that of a court-martial161
and “the structure of appellate review is virtually identical across
the two systems.”162 Harkening back to Justice Scalia’s argument
158
Id. (emphasis in original). The court explained further that this approach
“made sense in light of its abstention jurisprudence.” Id. The adequacy prong was
derived from the Councilman Court’s decision not to “evaluate the on-the-ground
performance of courts-martial” proceedings, but rather to assume “the sufficiency of
the structure Congress created . . . .” Id. As to the importance prong, the Court
reasoned that Councilman believed abstention would serve the vital interest of
military discipline, which would be stymied by federal court intrusion. Id.
159
Id. at 122.
160
Id.; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 672–78 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
161
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 122. Both have twelve members in capital cases
and a presiding military judge. Id. Moreover, the MCA aligned the rules of evidence
used in commissions with those used in courts-martial, 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2012),
which is particularly important in the context of hearsay, 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(3)(D)
(2012). Finally, Congress incorporated a slightly modified version of the Classified
Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”) to govern the handling of classified information
and the procedures governing closed sessions. 10 U.S.C. § 949d(c) (2012).
162
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 122. The MCA authorized the Secretary of Defense
to establish an intermediate appellate tribunal, the CMCR, whose decisions were to
be reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia with
the possibility of review by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 10 U.S.C. §
950g(a)–(e) (2012).
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in Hamdan, the majority contended that the review structure
under the 2009 MCA is arguably “more insulated from military
influence than is the [review] structure for courts-martial.”163
Notwithstanding the evidentiary and procedural differences
between courts-martial proceedings and military commissions
under the 2009 MCA,164 the court concluded that the 2009 MCA
is “sufficiently adequate to point in favor of abstention.”165 AlNashiri’s claims to the contrary were unavailing because they
asked the court to “determine whether pretrial intervention is
warranted by examining the on-the-ground performance of the
system Congress and the Executive [had] established,” which is

163
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123 (citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 675–76 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)). Whereas the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces serves as the
ultimate review body for courts-martial proceedings under the UCMJ, the defendant
in a military commission under the 2009 MCA can appeal the CMCR’s ultimate
decision to the D.C. Circuit court, whose judges have Article III’s guarantees of life
tenure and salary protection. Id. at 122–23.
164
See Denny LeBoeuf, Executing the Evidence, ACLU: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
PROJECT (Jan. 20, 2011, 12:23 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/executingevidence?redirect=blog/capital-punishment-national-security/executing-evidence
(arguing the military commissions are plagued by “unfairly lax rules for allowing
evidence, admission of coerced testimony, and censorship of evidence of the torture
of prisoners”). But see Solis, supra note 39, at 75 (“In keeping with their utilitarian
in-the-field-nature, [military commissions] have employed less stringent rules of
procedure and evidence than are found in either domestic courts or courts-martial.”).
Relatedly, Al-Nashiri has claimed that his 2007 confession to USS Cole bombing was
coerced through five years of torture. Gabriel Haboubi, Guantanamo Detainee Says
Torture Prompted Confession to USS Cole Bombing, JURIST: PAPERCHASE (Mar. 30,
2007, 3:42 PM), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2007/03/guantanamo-detaineesays-torture.php. Nevertheless, the Al-Nashiri II court believed that al-Nashiri’s
trial will include “a number of significant procedural and evidentiary safeguards,”
including “the right to be represented by counsel, 10 U.S.C. § 949c, be presumed
innocent, id. § 949l, obtain and offer exculpatory evidence, id. § 949j . . . and
challenge for cause any of the members of the military commission and the military
judge, id. § 949f.” Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123. Importantly, al-Nashiri did not
challenge the ability of the military commission and its various appellate bodies to
fully adjudicate his defense. Id.
165
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123. Another Comment analyzing the Al-Nashiri II
decision questions this conclusion. Recent Case, In re Al-Nashiri, 835 F.3d 110 (D.C.
Cir. 2016), 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1249 (2017) [hereinafter Harvard Comment]. Focusing
on the fact that the MCA, unlike the rules for courts-martial, does not guarantee
prompt appellate review, the author argues that the possibility of undue delay
renders the commission system inadequate for the purposes of abstention. Id. at
1252–53. But the court addressed al-Nashiri’s claims of unreasonable delay and
found that he was complicit in the delay. Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 135 (“We decline
to label unreasonable or excessive a delay Al-Nashiri has not contested.”). Although
the court was “troubled” by the prospective delay, it reasoned soundly that alNashiri did not come with clean hands. Id.
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exactly what Councilman declined to do.166 Just as such a
scrupulous review was unwarranted when examining the
congressionally established court-martial system in Councilman,
it is also unwarranted when examining the congressionally
established military commission system.167 The court concluded
that, absent a showing of unlawfulness or inability to fully
defend himself, al-Nashiri must proceed through the process
Congress created in the 2009 MCA.168
2.

Whether an “Important Countervailing Interest” Warrants
Abstention

Unlike the Supreme Court in Hamdan, the Al-Nashiri II
court identified an “important countervailing interest” to support
its decision to abstain: “the need for federal courts to avoid
exercising their equitable powers in a manner that would unduly
impinge on the prerogatives of the political branches in the
sensitive realm of national security.”169 The court understood the
provision for direct Article III review of al-Nashiri’s jurisdictional
challenge on appeal as an implicit instruction from Congress and
the President that judicial review should await the outcome of
the military commission proceeding.170 Further, because the
executive and legislative judgment providing for delayed Article
III review “was made out of concern for national security needs,”
the court concluded it must defer to that judgment.171
In short, the President sought authority from Congress to
convene military commissions he deemed necessary, and
Congress gave it to him in the Military Commissions Acts, which
delay Article III review until the military commission has issued
a final decision.172 Unwilling to disturb executive-legislative
cooperation on a core strategic component of warmaking—
prosecuting the enemy—the Al-Nashiri II court deferred to the

166

Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123 (citing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S.
738, 758 (1975) (concluding Congress’ judgment that the military court system is
adequate to perform its assigned task must be respected)).
167
But see Vladeck, supra note 10.
168
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123.
169
Id. at 124.
170
Id. at 125.
171
Id. at 124.
172
Id.
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political branches’ instruction as to the timing of Article III
review and decided Councilman abstention doctrine was
appropriately extended to the military commissions.173
D. Judge Tatel’s Dissent
Al-Nashiri argued that, even if Councilman applied, the
“unique” features of his case qualified him for the “extraordinary
circumstances” exception to the abstention doctrine.174 Under
this exception, a federal court may intervene where a plaintiff
demonstrates that his circumstances present the “threat of ‘great
and immediate’ injury and render the alternative tribunal
‘incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues
before it.’ ”175 Although the majority found that al-Nashiri’s
asserted harm was only “attendant to resolution of his case in the
military court system,”176 the dissent took issue with this
conclusion in light of the “years of brutal detention and
interrogation tactics” to which al-Nashiri was subjected.177 Judge
Tatel went on to chronicle the chilling details of al-Nashiri’s
treatment,178 concluding that the harms al-Nashiri will suffer

173

Id. at 125–26.
Id. at 128. Al-Nashiri made two additional arguments that were unavailing.
First, he argued that allowing the commission to proceed would violate his
constitutional and statutory “right not to be tried.” Id. at 131–35. Second, he argued
that the court should intervene because his commission proceedings have been
plagued by unreasonable delays. Id. at 135–36.
175
Id. (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123–24 (1975)).
176
Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975)).
177
Id. at 140 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
178
Denny LeBoeuf provides a poignant description of the enhanced
interrogation tactics to which al-Nashiri was subjected:
U.S. officials waterboarded al-Nashiri. They bent him over backwards in a
stress position until one of his interrogators worried that his arms would
become dislocated. He was naked, hooded, shackled, and deprived of sleep.
His “debriefers” blew smoke in his face, stood on his ankle shackles, and
scrubbed his naked body with a stiff wire brush. His torturers hung him
from the ceiling by his arms, while they were tied behind his back. And if
these medieval torments were not enough to render a subsequent capital
trial problematic, his torturers also revved a power drill next to his naked,
hooded body. And racked a handgun near his head. “Once or twice.”
Denny LeBoeuf, supra note 164; see also Richard Esposito & Jason Ryan, CIA Chief:
We Waterboarded, ABC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/TheLaw/
story?id=4244423&page=1. But see Memorandum from Scott W. Muller to John Yoo
on the Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured
Al-Qa’ida Personnel (Apr. 28, 2003), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files
/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc17.pdf (stating that the foregoing
174
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from the government’s prosecution of him in a military
commission are “a far cry from the ordinary burdens . . . that
individuals endure in the course of defending against criminal
prosecutions.”179
Sympathetic to the dissent’s argument, Judge Griffith
remained unconvinced that the extraordinary circumstances
exception applied.180 Because al-Nashiri failed to show that the
military commission would not provide him a fair trial, and out of
a concern for reshaping the scope of the exception to “create a
novel free-floating exception for psychological harm,” the
majority decided the District Court correctly extended and
applied Councilman abstention to al-Nashiri’s petition.181 The
next Part evaluates this conclusion and examines its
consequences for ongoing military commission proceedings.
IV. THE VIRTUES OF ABSTENTION
This Part sets out to assess the different outcomes in
Hamdan and Al-Nashiri II, focusing on the role deference played
in the latter decision and clarifying the separation of powers
argument underlying the result. This Part also articulates the
decision’s consequences for future collateral attacks on
commission proceedings.
A.

Deference and Separation of Powers: Assessing the Different
Outcomes in Hamdan and Al-Nashiri II

Under the 2009 MCA, Congress decided that federal courts
should be limited to exercising post-trial review of the final
judgments of military commissions.
Applying Councilman
abstention to military commissions under the 2009 MCA ensures
that legislative prerogative is carried out.182 The Hamdan Court
made clear that congressional involvement in crafting the
military commissions would resolve the deficiencies it had
identified; following that guidance, the Al-Nashiri II court
deferred where Hamdan did not. The vehicle for this deferential
posture was abstention, which allowed the court to defer to the
interrogation “techniques . . . violate neither Federal criminal law nor the Fifth,
Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments”).
179
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 140.
180
Id. at 129 (majority opinion).
181
Id. at 130.
182
Margulies, supra note 8.
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judgment of the political branches that prosecuting some enemy
detainees in a military commission is in the nation’s best
interest, and that those commissions should be left undisturbed
until they issue a final ruling. The benefits of this deferential
approach are twofold: First, it will inform and narrow eventual
Article III review of the commission’s decision, as well as
congressional review of the military commission system
generally. Second, it provides guidance for lower courts that will
ensure uniform adjudication of habeas petitions from
Guantánamo.
Before discussing the decision’s impact, it is important to
clarify what the Al-Nashiri II court deferred to, and what it did
not. The panel deferred to the considered, measured judgment of
Congress that military commissions are the appropriate forum
for trying some enemy detainees, and that Article III courts
should review the final judgments of these commissions. The
panel did not defer to the military commissions themselves, as
the dissent contended and some commentators have suggested.183
Counsel for al-Nashiri did not claim that the military commission
convened to try him suffered from a structural or procedural
defect. Nor did he assert that the commission itself was
unconstitutional. Had there been a showing of either, then
deference would have been inappropriate.184 But because the
only argument put forth by al-Nashiri—that the commission
lacked jurisdiction to try him—is a question that Congress
expressly authorized the commission to determine, the court
respected that judgment.185
The court emphasized that it would not base its abstention
decision on the on-the-ground performance of the military
commissions, which has been unimpressive at best.186 But this is
a byproduct of the court’s deference to the congressionally
sanctioned military commission system in the first place. The

183
Vladeck, supra note 10 (“[C]an anyone actually argue with a straight face
that the track record of the commissions to date justifies the deference and respect at
the heart of the D.C. Circuit’s decision to abstain?”); Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 139
(Tatel, J., dissenting) (“The notion that federal courts should delay exercising their
habeas jurisdiction out of respect for a system of rarely used and temporary
tribunals strikes me as rather odd.”).
184
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d at 123.
185
Id. at 125.
186
In fifteen years, the commissions have handed down only eight convictions.
Vladeck, supra note 10.
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legitimacy of military commissions derives from joint
congressional-executive action expressly authorizing their use as
a tool to fight terrorism; their track record is immaterial.187 To
consider the commissions’ track record when deciding to abstain,
and therefore defer, would prove unworkable. What, precisely,
would be a track record meriting deference? Would it be based
on the number of convictions? The number of convictions later
overturned by federal courts? Or would each commission would
have to earn respect individually, based on the performance of
the individual military judge discharging his or her duty?
Whatever on-the-ground problems the military commissions may
encounter will be sorted out by them in the first instance, with
the possibility for federal court review of those issues once a final
judgment has been issued in the proceeding.188 This is the
process Congress and the President prescribed, and the process
that Al-Nashiri II respected.
The decision to defer in Al-Nashiri II was based on
principled separation of powers considerations, not a policy
judgment on the effectiveness of the current system. The panel
opted to defer to the military commissions only when there was
bilateral support from the political branches. The theoretical
framework for judicial deference articulated by Professors Pildes,
Issacharoff, and Sunstein appears best capable of describing the
court’s separation of powers rationale, then. With the MCA in
place, the executive is now convening military commissions
whose appellate structure and composition was considered,
crafted, and enacted by Congress. The Al-Nashiri II court
accepted that joint executive-legislative judgment. Additionally,
the decision has the features of the “minimalist alternative”
introduced by Professor Sunstein.
Rather than decide
prematurely the difficult jurisdiction question, the court issued a
narrow and incompletely theorized decision that will sharpen
eventual Article III review of the question on appeal.
187

None of this is to suggest that the track record of the current commission
system should not be a concern for congressional leaders charged with making policy
decisions on how the nation should bring to justice those who commit crimes likes
the ones allegedly committed by al-Nashiri. The point here is that the commissions’
track record has little bearing on the question of abstention.
188
See Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 137 (D.D.C. 2008) (“If the
Military Commission judge gets it wrong, his error may be corrected by the CMCR.
If the CMCR gets it wrong, it may be corrected by the D.C. Circuit. And if the D.C.
Circuit gets it wrong, the Supreme Court may grant a writ of certiorari.”).
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It was one thing for federal courts to intervene into the
ongoing trial of a military commission when it lacked explicit
congressional authorization;189 it is quite another for federal
judges to disregard congressional policy decisions regarding the
timing of federal court review. By deferring to the joint actions of
the political branches in an area rife with national security
concerns—the prosecution and punishment of enemy
belligerents—the D.C. Circuit appropriately weighed the
separation of powers considerations underlying abstention
doctrine. Because the establishment of military commissions has
been traditionally within the “pattern of cooperation between the
President and Congress in war and national security affairs,”190
and because “in the realm of national security, the expertise of
the political branches is at its apogee,”191 deference in this
context furthers sound separation of powers principles.192
B. The Consequences of Al-Nashiri Abstention for Article III
Review of Commissions
The D.C. Circuit’s Al-Nashiri II decision has several
important consequences. First, it lends appellate approval to the
numerous district court decisions that abstained from
intervening into ongoing military commission proceedings after
Congress expressly approved of their use. Second, it permits the
application of military expertise in deciding complex law of war
issues, just as Congress intended. Finally, it allows for more
informed congressional review of the military commission system
as a whole.
Al-Nashiri II lends appellate approval to the growing
number of district courts that had applied Councilman
abstention to collateral attacks on ongoing commission

189
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 12, at 44 (noting “[where] the executive has
acted . . . without legislative approval, the courts have invalidated executive action,
even during wartime . . . .”).
190
Ku & Yoo, supra note 18, at 207.
191
Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Hamad v. Gates, 732
F.3d 990, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Congress’s decisions with respect to [Guantánamo]
detainees are at the core of Congress’s authority with respect to ‘the conduct of
foreign relations [and] the war power.’ ”) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81
n.17 (1976))).
192
See discussion supra notes 12–17.
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proceedings in Hamdan’s wake.193 For example, in Khadr v.
Bush,194 the court found judicial “respect for a congressionallyauthorized military court system that includes independent
review by civilian judges” warranted abstention.195 Because the
claims in Khadr’s habeas petition “have been, will be, or, at the
very least, can be raised in the military commission proceeding
and the subsequent appeals process,” the court declined to
intervene.196 In a second habeas petition requesting a federal
court enjoin Khadr’s ongoing commission proceeding, the court
again abstained and reiterated the reasoning of the earlier
decision.197 Perhaps the best indicator that much has changed
since Hamdan is that in a later habeas petition brought by
Hamdan himself, the district court found that Councilman’s
“central rationale is applicable here.”198 The court recognized
that congressional involvement in the 2006 MCA had changed
the abstention equation:
“Hamdan is to face a
military . . . commission designed by a Congress that . . . act[ed]
according to guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court.”199 In a
nod to judicial modesty, the court noted, “Article III judges do not
have a monopoly on justice, or on constitutional learning.”200
Relatedly, the recent D.C. Circuit decision in Bahlul recognized
that congressional involvement has fortified military
commissions from dissection in a federal court.201 In extending
Councilman abstention to the military commissions under the
MCA, lower courts have recognized the proper role each branch

193
See, e.g., Al-Nashiri v. MacDonald, No. 11-5907 RJB, 2012 WL 1642306, at
*11 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2012) (“[U]nder the principles of abstention announced in
Councilman, the Court should not exercise equitable jurisdiction.”). Indeed, as
another D.C. Circuit military commission abstention case makes clear, “abstention is
surely not appropriate where . . . a trial before a military commission is only a
possibility and only at some unspecified time in the future.” Obaydullah v. Obama,
609 F.3d 444, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
194
587 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D.D.C. 2008).
195
Id. at 231.
196
Id. at 230–31.
197
Khadr v. Obama, 724 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64–68 (D.D.C. 2010).
198
Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136 (D.D.C. 2008).
199
Id. (quoting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2006)).
200
Id. at 137.
201
See Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Pursuant to
congressional authorization, Presidents throughout U.S. history have employed
military commissions to try enemy war criminals for conspiracy to commit war
crimes.”).
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of government plays in this context: Congress creates the
commissions, the executive conducts them, and the judiciary
reviews their judgments.202
By requiring al-Nashiri to follow the MCA’s thorough review
procedures, rather than allow him to “jump the line” and shortcircuit the carefully designed process, the court ensured that
military judges will have the opportunity to apply their expertise
to the complex law of war questions before them. Al-Nashiri’s
jurisdictional challenge requires the court to decide when
hostilities began with al Qaida. Resolving the extent to which an
armed conflict existed when al-Nashiri’s actions were committed
will benefit from the application of military expertise. The
question involves “the military nature of violent acts” as well as
the “military nature of al-Nashiri’s conduct.”203 Of course, a
federal district court could order discovery on these questions,
but as was pointed out at oral argument, there is a difference
between having all the facts and having the expertise to draw
conclusions from those facts.204 Just because a federal district
court judge has the same facts in front of her does not mean that
she has the “singularly relevant” expertise to resolve the factbound jurisdictional question at issue.205 None of this is to
question the capacity of the federal district courts to resolve
complicated issues in a wide range of subject matter areas.206
But when Congress passed the MCA, which delays Article III
review until the commission has rendered a judgment, and two
successive administrations opted to prosecute detainees in a
commission proceeding, the political branches gave responsibility
to military judges to decide in the first instance questions like
the one al-Nashiri has raised. It is unclear what benefit shortcircuiting the military commission’s role in trying al-Nashiri

202
Al-Nashiri v. MacDonald, No. 11-5907 RJB, 2012 WL 1642306, at *11 (W.D.
Wash. May 10, 2012).
203
Oral Argument at 24:30, Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110 (2016), https://www.
cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2016.nsf/77A3A67AD3EF915385257F5C006
765E1/$file/15-1023.mp3; Government’s Brief, supra note 1, at *49.
204
Oral Argument at 25:50, Al-Nashiri II, 835 F.3d 110 (2016), https://
www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2016.nsf/77A3A67AD3EF915385257F5
C006765E1/$file/15-1023.mp3.
205
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 760 (1975).
206
Indeed, a corollary of this respect is that respect should be given to military
judges who faithfully discharge their duties as well. Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 587 (2006).
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would bring, but the drawbacks, such as duplicative
proceedings207 and needless conflict with policy-makers, are
readily discernible.
Further, there is historical support for delaying Article III
review until the military commission has issued a final
judgment. In Ex parte Vallandigham, Ex parte Milligan, and In
re Yamashita, the military commission had already tried and
sentenced the defendant before a federal court became
involved.208 Obviously this was not the case in either Ex parte
Quirin or Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, but the passage of the MCA
casts doubt on those cases as precedent for federal court
intervention.
Not only did abstention ensure that eventual Article III
review will be informed by military judge expertise and
narrowed, it also will ensure that eventual congressional review
of the military commission system will be informed by the actual,
rather than hypothesized, proceedings of the commissions.209 If
the commission convened to try al-Nashiri proves incapable of
fairly and efficiently deciding his jurisdictional challenge, then
policy-makers should consider that failure when revising legal
systems aimed at trying terrorists for war crimes. If a federal
court intervenes and bails out the military commission, then the
commissions’ shortcomings will not come to light. In this regard,
abstaining lends legitimacy to the current military commission
system without insulating them from eventual congressional
review of their effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Jackson noted in Johnson v. Eisentrager, “Modern
American law has come a long way since the time when outbreak
of war made every enemy national an outlaw, subject to both

207
Peter Margulies, supra note 8. To demonstrate the point, suppose the panel
decided abstention was improper. Presumably, it would remand the case to the
district court to conduct a “mini trial” on the question of when an armed conflict
with al Qaida began. Resolving the issue would be complex, and if the district court
determined an armed conflict existed—a determination that would surely be
appealed—the military commission would still have to revisit the issue in its own
proceeding. Abstention is aimed at avoiding precisely such duplicative proceedings.
208
Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2
(1866); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
209
Cf. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 35.
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public and private slaughter, cruelty and plunder.”210 With some
unfortunate exceptions,211 U.S. military commissions historically
have exceeded the international norms of their day.212 This truth
makes the current system’s shortcomings all the more
unfortunate, and make no mistake, these shortcomings are on
full display in the prosecution of al-Nashiri.213 But these
shortcomings are no pretext for judicial immodesty. When
Congress and the President act jointly on a matter touching on
national security, longstanding separation of powers principles
demand that their judgments receive judicial deference. Having
asked, the Supreme Court received express congressional
authorization of the military commissions, which empowered
federal courts to review commission decisions at a specific point.
The Al-Nashiri II court followed the system’s order of operations
and left policy-making to the nation’s legislature. Going forward,
the military commissions will be allowed to proceed
uninterrupted until they issue a final judgment, provided the
commission does not suffer from a constitutional defect, just as
Congress intended. Thus, as Judge Bryan noted in another alNashiri decision, “While the use of military commissions . . . is
subject to debate and criticism, their existence is for the people to
decide through Congress consistent with the Constitution.”214

210

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768–69 (1950).
See Chomsky, supra note 39, at 55.
212
See David Glazier, The Development of an Exceptional Court: The History of
the American Military Commission, in GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL
COURTS AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 39,
at 37, 37.
213
In just one example, al-Nashiri’s counsel estimated in his briefing that his
trial will not commence until 2018, and further estimated in rebuttal at oral
argument that appellate review of al-Nashiri’s claims will not occur until 2024; the
government did not challenge this estimate at oral argument. Al-Nashiri II, 835
F.3d at 135. The troubles have continued. See Amy Davidson Sorkin, At
Guantánamo, Are Even the Judges Giving Up?, NEW YORKER (Feb. 20, 2018), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/at-guantanamo-are-even-the-judgesgiving-up.
214
Al-Nashiri v. MacDonald, No. 11-5907 RJB, 2012 WL 1642306, at *11 (W.D.
Wash. May 10, 2012).
211

